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Comments
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THERMAL IMAGING
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, both federal and state law enforcement officials
have increasingly employed thermal imagers to detect the indoor cultiva-
tion of marijuana.1 A thermal imager, which detects infrared radiation,
1. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 383, 447
(1997) (stating that thermal imaging "permits law enforcement officials to identify
heat sources within a building, and thus, facilitates location of drug laboratories or
in-house marijuana farms"); see also Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology and the
Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7
WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 975, 986 (1999) (noting that thermal imaging can be used
to detect excessive "waste heat" that could signify illegal activity such as indoor
marijuana cultivation); Scott J. Smith, Note, Thermal Surveillance and the Extraordi-
nary Device Exception: Re-Defining the Scope of the Katz Analysis, 30 VAL. U. L. REv.
1071, 1071 n.4 (1996) (stating that "[t]hermal imagery has emerged across the
country as the government's most recent weapon in its war on drugs"); Thomas D.
Colbridge, Thermal Imaging: Much Heat but Little Light, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.,
Dec. 1997, at 19 (noting that although thermal imaging technology is not new, law
enforcement has only recently employed use of device).
The Drug Enforcement Administration's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppres-
sion Program Final Report states that during 1990, thermal imaging was utilized in
numerous locations throughout the United States to support justification of a
probable cause conclusion and in numerous search warrant affidavits. See DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1990 DOMESTIC CANNABIS
ERADICATIN/SUPPRESSION PROGRAM 29 (1990) (discussing fact that thermal detec-
tion of indoor cannabis plant cultivation was increasing). Furthermore, the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") has noted that both the DEA (visited Mar.
13, 2000) and cooperating agencies are adapting to the increased indoor cultiva-
tion of marijuana by employing advanced technologies to build effective cases
against indoor growers. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DEA BRIEFING BooK 58-83 (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter DEA BRIEFING BOOK], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/briefingbook/pagel6-31.htm#marijuana (reporting
on DEA's efforts to curb use of illegal drugs).
According to the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), marijuana is
the most commonly used illicit drug in America today. See id. at 16-31 (describing
prevalence of usage of marijuana). The term "marijuana" refers to the leaves and
flowering tops of the cannabis plant. See id. Marijuana is a tobacco-like substance
produced by drying the leaves and flowering tops of the cannabis plant, and its
potency varies depending on the source and selection of plant materials used. See
id. DOJ further notes that sinsemilla, which is derived from the unpollinated fe-
male cannabis plant, and hashish, the resinous material of the cannabis plant, are
popular with users because of their high concentration of THC (delta-9-te-
trahydrocannabinol), the chemical responsible for most of the psychoactive effects
of the plant. See id. (discussing DOJ research on drug users).
(241)
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aids in identifying heat emitted from buildings. 2 Law enforcement offi-
cials have used this technology to search private residences for an abnor-
mal emission of heat, a common indicator of indoor marijuana
cultivation. 3 Although use of thermal imagers may aid law enforcement,
the constitutionality of employing this new technology must be consid-
ered.4 Many courts have addressed whether the use of such a device by
the government constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment to the
The trend toward the indoor cultivation of marijuana stems from effective
efforts by law enforcement officials to curb outdoor cultivation. See id. (discussing
findings of DEA BRIEFING BOOK). The DEA BRIEFING BOOK also notes that indoor
cultivation permits year-round production and ranges from several plants grown in
a closet, to thousands of plants grown in elaborate, specially constructed green-
houses. See id. The DEA estimates that indoor growers cultivated eighty-nine
plants each on average, and in 1998, law enforcement officials seized 2616 indoor
operations. See id. Because indoor cultivation provides a controlled environment,
"[r]ates of vegetation, growth, and maturation are enhanced by special fertilizers,
plant hormones, steroids, insecticides, and genetic engineering." Id. Additionally,
in 1998, the DEA identified California, Florida, Oregon, Alaska and Kentucky as
the five leading states for indoor growing activity. See id.
2. See T. Wade McKnight, Comment, Passive, Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting
the Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness" Burden, 59 LA. L. REv. 1243, 1249 (1999) (ex-
plaining how thermal imagers operate); see also United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d
850, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747,
748-49 (Ky. 1996) (same). Essentially, a thermal imager detects differences in the
temperature of the atmosphere. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851 (noting that "thermal
imager detects differences in surface temperature of targeted objects and displays
those differences through a viewfinder in varying shades of white and gray"). The
differences in temperature are displayed through a viewfinder. See LaFollette, 915
S.W.2d at 748-49 (stating that device "displays the differences in temperature
through a viewfinder in varying shades of color"). The device records its readings
on a standard videocassette recorder tape. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 852 (recognizing
that device can record readings on standard videocassette).
In LaFollette, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained how the police use this
device to detect marijuana cultivation:
[A] structure being used for the purpose of cultivating marijuana under
artificial lighting would produce and show a significant amount of heat
due to the large amounts of heat [that] grow-lights or artificial lights gen-
erate . . . . [T]his heat would also cause the structure to register as
warmer on the FLIR than similar types of structures without any internal
sources of heat.
LaFollette, 915 S.W.2d at 749 (quoting United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220,
224 (D. Haw. 1991)).
3. See Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DuKE L.J. 787, 867 (1999)
(stating that "[flor a number of years, the government has utilized 'thermal
imagers' to search private residences for illegal drug cultivation"). The Montana
Supreme Court, in State v. Siegal, noted that "[i]ndoor marijuana growing opera-
tions utilize incandescent heat lamps to mimic the sun's radiation." 934 P.2d 176,
180 (Mont. 1997), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont.
1998). The Siegal court also noted that "[w] hile structures concealing this sort of
activity may appear no different to the naked eye than other structures, indoor
marijuana growing operations typically generate substantial amounts of heat and,
hence, infrared radiation, which, with the proper technology, can be detected
from outside the structure." Id.
4. See Colbridge, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that "unlike criminals, police of-
ficers must act within the confines of their federal and state constitutions").
[Vol. 46: p. 241
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss1/7
2001] COMMENT
United States Constitution.5 An examination of these cases reveals a diver-
gence of opinion on whether law enforcement's use of a thermal imager is
constitutional. 6 Because of this split of authority, the United States Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari to a case dealing with this issue.7
This Comment examines the various views on the constitutionality of
thermal image searches and also offers a proposal for resolving the consti-
tutional issues raised by law enforcement's use of thermal imagers. Part II
briefly describes how thermal imaging technology operates and the consti-
tutional framework for analyzing law enforcement's use of this device. 8
Part III outlines the majority and minority views on the constitutionality of
5. See generally United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that use of thermal imaging does not constitute search), cert. granted, 2000 WL
267066 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-8508); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d
1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); Ishmae4 48 F.3d at 857 (same); United States v.
Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d
1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). But see United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d
1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that use of thermal imaging constitutes
search), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
State courts are also divided on this issue. Compare People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal.
App. 4th 1224, 1227 (1996) (holding that warrantless use of thermal image was
unconstitutional search under Fourth Amendment), Commonwealth v. Gindles-
perger, 743 A.2d 898, 906 (Pa. 1999) (same), State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601
(Wash. 1994) (holding infrared surveillance is search under United States and
Washington constitutions), with State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992) (same), LaFollette, 915 S.W.2d at 750 (same), State v. Niel, 671 So. 2d 1111,
1112 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding thermal imaging is not search under Fourth
Amendment), and State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(same).
The use of thermal imaging by the government has also engendered debate
among scholars. See Melinda Foster, Note, State v. Young: A Cool View Toward In-
frared Thermal-Detection Devices, 30 GONZ. L. REv. 135, 154-61 (1994) (discussing con-
stitutionality of thermal imaging); Lisa Tuenge Hale, Comment, United States v.
Ford: The Eleventh Circuit Permits Unrestricted Police Use of Thermal Surveillance on Pri-
vate Property Without a Warrant, 29 GA. L. Rv. 819, 837-45 (1995) (same); Susan
Moore, Note, Does Heat Emanate Beyond the Threshold?: Home Infrared Emissions, Re-
mote Sensing, and the Fourth Amendment Threshold, 70 CHI.-KEr L. REv. 803, 843-52
(1994) (same); Lynne M. Pochurek, Note, From the Battleftont to the Homefront: In-
frared Surveillance and the War on Drugs Place Privacy Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 137, 165-67 (1994) (same); Daniel J. Polatsek, Note, Thermal Imaging and the
Fourth Amendment: Pushing the Katz Test Towards Terminal Velocity, 13 J. MARSHALLJ.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 453, 476-78 (1995) (same); Tracy M. White, Note, The Heat Is
On: The Warrantless Use of Infrared Surveillance to Detect Indoor Marijuana Cultivation,
27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 295, 300-08 (1995) (same); Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant
Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come
at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 Ky.
L.J. 891, 899-910 (1994-95) (same).
6. See Luna, supra note 3, at 867 (stating that federal courts have been unable
to reach consensus regarding constitutionality of thermal imaging searches).
7. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1041 (considering constitutionality of use of thermal
imaging by law enforcement).
8. For a discussion on thermal imaging technology and how courts have ana-
lyzed the technology under the Katz test, see infra notes 12-35 and accompanying
text.
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thermal imaging and the rationales supporting each view.9 Part IV ana-
lyzes the approaches taken by various courts and proposes alternative
modes of analysis.10 Lastly, Part V concludes with a proposal for how the
Supreme Court can resolve this issue.'1
II. THERMAL IMAGING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. What Is a Thermal Imager?
Prior to engaging in an analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues aris-
ing from the use of thermal imaging by the government, a brief descrip-
tion of the technology is necessary to fully grasp its constitutional
implications. 12 A thermal imager detects infrared emissions emanating
from an object.' 3 The imager then converts the heat into a color image,
usually in the form of a black and white, two-dimensional picture. 14 As the
amount of heat increases, the object becomes increasingly white; con-
versely, a cooler object will appear darker. 15 The device does not measure
the actual temperature of the object, but rather, it measures the object's
temperature relative to its environment.' 6 Activities that generate a signif-
9. For a discussion on the majority and minority views on the constitutionality
of thermal imaging, see infra notes 36-132 and accompanying text.
10. For a critique of the majority view and a proposed alternative scheme of
analysis, see infra notes 133-97 and accompanying text.
11. For a concluding thought on resolving this legal controversy, see infra
notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
12. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1077-85 (describing thermal imaging technol-
ogy); Lisa J. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of Warrantless Infrared
Searches, 29 CrIM. L. BULL. 19, 24-25 (1993) (same). Prior to any discussion con-
cerning the constitutionality of government action, an understanding of the gov-
ernment's action and the devices it uses is necessary. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 3,
at 864-71 (describing in detail government actions that impact search and seizure
law).
13. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1079 (stating that thermal imagers detect infra-
red.emissions from objects). An infrared emission is one of several forms of en-
ergy, such as radio waves, microwaves, heat, visible light, ultraviolet light, X-rays
and gamma rays. See Steele, supra note 12, at 24 (noting that "infrared emissions
form part of the infrared spectrum"). Thus, infrared radiation is one of many
forms of energy in the infrared spectrum. See id. (discussing nature of infrared
emissions). Infrared radiation is invisible to the human eye. See id. (same).
14. See M. Annette Lanning, Thermal Surveillance: Do Infrared Eyes in the Sky
Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1771, 1773-74 (1995) (stating
that thermal imagers produce black and white images, denoting warm and cool
areas). But see FLIR Systems, Vision: New Breakthroughs in Imaging Systems, available at
http://www.flir.com/thermography/resources/gallery/index.htm/lang (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2000) (displaying color image capabilities of FLIR model).
15. See McKnight, supra note 2, at 1249 (stating that thermal imager provides
visual image of objects that are warmer or cooler in shades of black and white).
16. See Colbridge, supra note 1, at 18 (stating thermal imager converts invisi-
ble infrared radiation emitted from object and converts its readings into two-di-
mensional, black and white image); see also Lanning, supra note 14, at 1773
(describing how FLIR operates). Relative to the ambient environment, a hotter
object appears whiter, and conversely, a cooler object appears blacker. See Lan-
ning, supra note 14, at 1773.
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icant amount of heat produce a detectable "heat signature" that a thermal
imager may be able to depict as distinct images under certain condi-
tions.17 A thermal imager neither enhances nor amplifies the infrared
spectrum, but instead solely detects heat, which is a portion of the infrared
spectrum.
18
One popular form of thermal imaging is a Forward Looking Infrared
Device, or "FLIR."19 Some FLIRs are sensitive enough to identify the heat
generated by a heartbeat. 20 FLIRs can detect the presence of a person
behind a wall or curtain and, in effect, determine the state of affairs within
a structure. 21 FLIRs are employed in a variety of ways outside law enforce-
ment, including military and scientific research. 22
17. SeeJonathan Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of
the Drug Business: Thermal Imagers, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment,
84 CAL. L. REv. 1437, 1466 (1996) (discussing thermal imaging technology). In
United States v. Cusumano, judge McKay's dissent noted that military thermal
imagers have the capability to depict distinct images, and recognized that it is "only
a matter of time before such capabilities trickle down to law enforcement." 83
F.3d at 1247, 1257 n.12 (10th Cir. 1996) (McKayJ., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part).
18. See Matthew L. Zabel, Comment, A High-Tech Assault on the Castle: Warrant-
less Thermal Surveillance of Private Residences and the Fourth Amendment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 267, 280 n.100 (1995) (stating that thermal imagers only detect heat).
19. See Raytheon Systems Company, The Avenger FLIR Receiver Is Reliable, Afford-
able, and Easy to Maintain, available at http://www.ueci.com/rsc/ses/spr/spr_afl/
sprafl.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2000) (providing information on FLIR technol-
ogy); see also Lanning, supra note 14, at 1772-73 (noting that "[p]olice departments
across the country commonly employ the infrared scanner, or Forward Looking
Infrared Device (FLIR)").
The FLIR detects and tracks targets through infrared light rays. See Raytheon
Systems Company, supra (detailing capabilities of FLIR). Raytheon Systems' web-
site states:
The Avenger Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) Receiving Set consists of
a FLIR receiver and a display unit. The receiver is a passive, serial
scanned, infrared imaging system operating in the 8-12 g spectral region.
The display unit contains all controls required to operate the receiver
and presents the operator with a real-time thermal image of the target
scene.
Id.
20. See Laba, supra note 17, at 1466-67 (noting sensitivity of FLIRs). FLIRs
have been used to determine whether rooms in a building. were occupied. See id.
One commentator noted that during the siege of the Branch Davidian complex in
Waco, Texas, the FBI used FLIRs to determine whether specific rooms were occu-
pied. See id.
21. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994) (noting that with this
device, officer was able to see through walls of home); see also Laba, supra note 17,
at 1465-67 (examining assumption that FLIRs are non-intrusive technologies).
22. See Steele, supra note 12, at 25 (detailing other non-law enforcement uses
of thermal imaging technology). Within the scientific community, oceanogra-
phers and geologists have used thermal imaging technology. See id. (relating dif-
ferent uses of thermal imagers). Utility companies have also used thermal imaging
technology to identify overloaded wires and insulators. See id.
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B. The Constitutional Framework
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
for "[t] he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."2 3 The Fourth
Amendment issue raised by thermal imaging technology is whether law
enforcement's use of the device constitutes a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 24 If a thermal image scan is not a search, then
there are no constitutional concerns under the Fourth Amendment. 25 If a
thermal image scan constitutes a search, then law enforcement officials
must abide by Fourth Amendment constraints. 2 6 Thus, determining that
a thermal image scan constitutes a search requires law enforcement offi-
cials to obtain a warrant or to establish an exception to the Constitution's
warrant requirement. 27
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1074-75 (detailing consequences of whether use
of thermal imaging constitutes search under Fourth Amendment); see also Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 388
(1974) (stating that "[t]o label any police activity a 'search' ... within the ambit of
the [Fourth] [A]mendment is to impose [the reasonableness] restrictions upon
it"); Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL.
U. L. REv. 383, 386 (1991) (discussing findings in Katz); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 555 (1990) (arguing
for recognition of new class of searches called "intrusions" with differing standards
of reasonableness); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: "Second to None in the
Bill of Rights", 75 ILL. B.J. 424, 427 (1987) (stating that for Fourth Amendment to
apply, "the police conduct in question must constitute either a 'search' or a
'seizure' as those terms are used in the Fourth Amendment").
25. See Katz, supra note 24, at 554-55 (detailing consequences if conduct is
determined not to be search). According to Katz, "[o]nly searches and seizures
are limited by the reasonableness standard. All other police activities-i.e., those
contacts that are not searches or seizures-may be conducted free of the limita-
tions imposed by the amendment." Id. at 555; accord Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 748-49 (1984) (holding that searches and seizures inside private residence
without warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances (ci-
tations omitted) (quotations omitted)). The United States Supreme Court has
also held that without a warrant, law enforcement cannot obtain information that
it could not otherwise legally obtain. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715
(1984) (stating that "[tihe monitoring of an electronic device ... does reveal a
critical fact about the interior of the premises that the government is extremely
interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise obtained without a
warrant").
26. See Katz, supra note 24, at 554 (stating consequences if conduct is deter-
mined to be search). According to Katz, "[w] hen that threshold inquiry is an-
swered affirmatively [that yes, there is a search], the fact that [F]ourth
[A]mendment coverage attaches does not, itself, prohibit police intrusion. It
merely means that the police conduct is subject to the amendment's reasonable-
ness command." Id. at 556.
27. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985) (stating Fourth
Amendment generally requires police to secure warrant before conducting
search). There are exceptions to the general rule that a warrant must be secured
before a search is undertaken. See, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643
(1983) (noting that inventory search constitutes well-defined exception to warrant
[Vol. 46: p. 241
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In Katz v. United States,28 the United States Supreme Court set forth
the test used to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to cer-
tain police activities. 29 The Court established the "reasonable expectation
of privacy test" to determine whether an activity is a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 30 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan described a
two-part test that first examines whether the individual under surveillance
had a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, whether that expecta-
tion is objectively reasonable. 3 1
When applying the Katz test to surveillance technologies, such as a
thermal imager, both prongs of the reasonable expectation of privacy test
require a thorough review.3 2 The subjective prong of the test examines
the behavior and the measures taken by an individual that indicate an
actual expectation of privacy. 33 Under the objective prong, "[t]he test of
requirement); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (recognizing
automobile exception to warrant requirement).
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. See id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing Fourth Amendment
test). In his concurrence, Justice Harlan elaborated the Katz expectation of privacy
test in language that has "often been relied upon by lower courts in interpreting
and applying Katz." WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 3.2, at 51 (2d ed. 1999). Justice Harlan stated:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of
outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to him-
self has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. See Kearns, supra note 1, at 985 (noting that Supreme Court in Katz re-
placed trespass doctrine with "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard for de-
termining when search has occurred under Fourth Amendment).
31. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring) (discussing privacy test).
Under the Katz Court's formulation, the analysis shifted from a focus on constitu-
tionally protected areas, such as individuals and houses, to whether there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 29, § 3.2, at 49-
54 (noting analysis of Katz test). Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections to involuntary taking of
blood), and Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (providing Fourth Amend-
ment protection to home), with Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (finding expectation of pri-
vacy in public phone booth). Thus, the new standard no longer requires a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected place. See Kearns, supra note 1, at 985
(discussing privacy expectation standards). The Court made "clear that the reach
of that [Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a phys-
ical intrusion into any given enclosure." Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
32. See Kearns, supra note 1, at 985 (discussing application of reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test to surveillance technology).
33. See id. (discussing factors examined in determining subjective expectation
of privacy). Several cases have discussed this issue. For example, in California v.
Ciraolo, the defendant harvested marijuana in his backyard. See 476 U.S. 207, 210
7
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legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'pri-
vate' activity, but 'whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."' 3 4 Al-
though the reasonable expectation of privacy test is well-established law, its
application to new technologies, like thermal imaging, poses vexing legal
questions with which courts are currently struggling.3 5
III. THERMAL IMAGING AND FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES
In light of this background framework, courts throughout the United
States have discussed whether law enforcement's use of a thermal imager
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3 6 A
majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that a thermal
image scan is not a search. 37 Several courts, however, have concluded that
law enforcement's use of a thermal imager is a search.3 8
(1986) (stating facts of case). Because the defendant's property had a large fence
around it, the police surveyed his property from an airplane. See id. Although the
Court held that the defendant's expectation of privacy was not objectively reasona-
ble, it noted that the defendant's efforts to erect a ten-foot-tall fence manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy. See id. at 211 (discussing holding).
34. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (discussing second prong of reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984))). If
the court determines that an individual had a subjective expectation of privacy,
then the court will examine whether that expectation is one which society recog-
nizes as reasonable. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing
privacy expectation standards).
35. See McKnight, supra note 2, at 1247 (noting two-pronged test proposed by
Justice Harlan has been starting point for Fourth Amendment analysis for over
thirty years).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1045-47 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 2000 WL 267066 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-8508) (applying Katz search
and seizure analysis). Courts deciding the constitutionality of a search consistently
employ Justice Harlan's test in deciding this issue. See Mark D. Kiser, Comment,
Constitutional Law: Fourth Amendment Searches and Seizures and Thermal Imaging, 51
FLA. L. REv. 723, 725 (1999) (noting that Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz
provided two-part test which became "the modern framework in which courts ana-
lyze Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues").
37. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1046 (holding thermal imaging is not search);
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v.
Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d
1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Robertson, 39 F.3d 891, 894
(8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994)
(same); United States v. Deaner, CR-92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
July 27, 1992) (same), affd, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Penny-
Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991) (same); State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d
147, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (same); LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d
747, 750 (Ky. 1996) (same); State v. Niel, 671 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(same); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (same).
38. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that thermal imaging is search), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th
Cir. 1996); People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232 (1996) (same); State v.
Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 180 (Mont. 1997) (holding thermal imager is search under
Montana's constitution), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont.
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A. The Majority View
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a thermal image scan does not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 39 Sev-
eral state courts have held similarly.40
Majority-view courts rely on several different rationales. 4 1 One ratio-
nale posits that thermal imaging is non-intrusive and, therefore, not a
search.4 2 Another rationale analogizes thermal imaging to canine sniffs.43
Still other courts reason that because thermal imaging detects heat emit-
ted from a source, thermal imagers should be compared to cases involving
the legal status of garbage placed on the curb for collection.4 4 A discus-
sion of cases involving thermal imaging illustrates how majority-view courts
determine that thermal image scans do not present constitutional
violations.
4 5
1. Thermal Imaging as a Non-Intrusive Technology
Many courts have reasoned that thermal imaging is not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the device "does
not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of a home."46 The
1998); Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 898 (Pa. 1999) (holding
thermal imaging is search); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601, 604 (Wash. 1994)
(same).
39. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047 (holding thermal imaging does not constitute
search); Ishmae4 48 F.3d at 852 (same); Myers, 46 F.3d at 670 (same); Robertson, 39
F.3d at 894 (same); Ford, 34 F.3d at 997 (same); Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058 (same).
40. See Deaner, 1992 WL 209966, at *6 (holding thermal image scan not
Fourth Amendment search); Cramer, 851 P.2d at 150 (same); N/e, 671 So. 2d at
1112 (same); McKee, 510 N.W.2d at 810 (same).
41. See Laba, supra note 17, at 1465-69 (detailing arguments used by majority-
view courts).
42. See id. at 1465-66 (discussing assumption that thermal imaging is non-in-
trusive technology).
43. See id. at 1468-69 (discussing dog sniff analogy); Lanning, supra note 14, at
1798-1802 (same).
44. See Laba, supra note 17, at 1467-68 (discussing waste heat analogy); Lan-
ning, supra note 14, at 1796-98 (same).
45. For a discussion of cases holding that thermal imaging does not constitute
a violation of the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes 98-132 and accompanying
text.
46. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
although thermal image scan violated defendant's subjective expectation of pri-
vacy, society does not recognize this expectation as reasonable); see also United
States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 2000 WL
267066 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-8508) (same); United States v. Ishmael, 48
F.3d 850, 855-56 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that although defendant exhibited subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, society does not recognize this expectation as
reasonable).
Several courts and commentators disagree. See Commonwealth v. Gindles-
perger, 743 A.2d 898, 905-06 (Pa. 1999) (rejecting analogy to dog-sniff searches
and finding use of thermal imager without warrant violated Fourth Amendment
9
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United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v.
Ford,47 observed that the thermal imager used by police in that case ap-
peared to be of "such low resolution as to render it incapable of revealing
the intimacy of detail and activity protected by the Fourth Amendment."4 8
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
Unites States v. Pinson,49 posited that the detection of heat emanating from
a home was not an intrusion into the home because no intimate details of
the home were observed and because there was no invasion of privacy.50
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States
under Katz analysis); see also Kearns, supra note 1, at 987-98 (discussing how ther-
mal imaging infringes on individual's right to privacy). These courts and commen-
tators argue that thermal imaging permits the government to observe activities
within the home. See Kearns, supra note 1, at 987 (considering controversy over
intrusion of thermal imaging). The Washington Supreme Court provided exam-
ples of how thermal imaging intrudes into a citizen's privacy. See State v. Young,
867 P.2d 593, 599 (Wash. 1994) (stating that device "invaded the home in the
sense the device was able to gather information about the interior of the defen-
dant's home that could not be obtained by naked eye observations").
47. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
48. Id. at 996. In Ford, agents of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
("FDLE") used a thermal imager to scan a mobile home in Venus, Florida. See id..
at 993. Ford owned the mobile home, which was located on land leased by Ford.
See id. Based on information that Ford and a cohort were growing marijuana in-
side the mobile home, FDLE agents and other law enforcement officers covertly
approached the structure late at night. See id. The officers entered over a locked
gate and traveled a quarter of a mile onto the leased property. See id. They estab-
lished surveillance in thick foliage approximately thirty-five to forty-five yards from
the mobile home. See id.
One agent viewed the mobile home through a thermal imager. See id. The
agent determined that the mobile home was emitting an inordinate amount of
heat through its floor and walls. See id. With this finding the FDLE obtained a
search warrant for the mobile home. See id. The agents' search revealed a hydro-
ponics laboratory and over 400 marijuana plants. See id. To secure his privacy,
Ford had boarded the mobile home's windows behind curtains. See id. Ford had
also punched holes in the floor of the mobile home and installed a blower to vent
the excess heat generated by the artificial lights. See id. Ford was arrested and
charged with conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation
of Chapter 21 U.S.C. § 846, and for possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute, in violation of Chapter 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See id.
Ford moved to suppress evidence seized from the mobile home prior to trial.
See id. (discussing defendant's motion). Ford challenged the FDLE's warrantless
use of a thermal imager "arguing that [it] constituted an impermissible search
under the Fourth Amendment." Id. Based on a magistrate's recommendation, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Ford's sup-
pression motion because the thermal image scan did not constitute a search viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment. See id. The court reasoned that Ford did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in heat escaping from his mobile home. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court and found that a thermal image scan did not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment. See id.
49. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
50. See id. at 1058 (stating that thermal imager did not violate privacy). In
Pinson, a law enforcement search of Pinson's home revealed an indoor marijuana
growing operation. See id. at 1057. The affidavit in support of the search warrant
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v. Kyllo,51 trivialized the nature of the police conduct when it stated, "l[t] he
scan merely indicated amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall
and not the detailed images of private activity that [defendant] suggests
the technology could expose."
5 2
included results from a thermal image scan, which indicated an excessive amount
of heat coming from the roof and a skylight of the residence. See id.
On appeal, Pinson argued that "the use of a thermal imager to detect the heat
emanating from his home without first obtaining a warrant constituted an unrea-
sonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1058.
The Eighth Circuit rejected Pinson's contention holding that a thermal image
scan was not a Fourth Amendment search. See id. at 1059.
51. 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 2000 WL 267066 (U.S. Sept.
26, 2000) (No. 99-8508).
52. Id. at 1047. In Kyllo, an agent of the United States Bureau of Land Man-
agement investigated Kyllo for a possible conspiracy to grow and distribute mari-
juana. See id. at 1043. Oregon law enforcement officials informed the Bureau that
Kyllo and Luanne, his wife, resided in an apartment complex where other suspects
resided. See id. The law enforcement officials also informed the Bureau that
Luanne had been arrested the month before for delivery and possession of a con-
trolled substance and that Kyllo had once told a police informant that he and
Luanne could supply marijuana. See id. The investigators subpoenaed Kyllo's util-
ity records. See id. Kyllo's electrical usage was abnormally high, indicating a possi-
ble indoor marijuana growing operation. See id.
A member of the Oregon National Guard examined Kyllo's residence with a
thermal imager. See id. at 1044. The Bureau concluded that there was high heat
loss emanating from the roof of Kyllo's home above the garage and from one wall.
See id. Kyllo's house also "showed much warmer" than the other homes. See id.
This information was interpreted as further evidence of marijuana production, "in-
ferring that the high levels of heat emission indicated the presence of high inten-
sity lights used to grow marijuana indoors." Id.
A warrant was issued to search Kyllo's home. See id. The search revealed an
indoor marijuana cultivation operation with more than 100 plants. See id. Mari-
juana, weapons and drug paraphernalia were seized. See id. Kyllo was indicted for
manufacturing marijuana. See id.
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Kyllo's
motion to suppress the seized evidence, following a hearing. See id. Kyllo entered
a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to a prison term of sixty-three months.
See id. Kyllo then appealed the denial of the suppression motion, challenging sev-
eral portions of the affidavit as well as the warrantless thermal imager scan. See id.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court
found that although the portion of the officer's affidavit discussing Kyllo's energy
usage was false and misleading, the false statements were not knowingly or reck-
lessly made. See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing
reasoning of court). Although the court concluded it was proper for the magis-
trate judge to consider that portion of the affidavit in determining probable cause
to issue the search warrant, the panel remanded the case for an evidentiary hear-
ing on the intrusiveness and capabilities of the thermal imager. See id. at 531 (not-
ing procedural history).
Following a hearing on remand, the district court concluded that an omission
from the affidavit was misleading, but was not knowingly false or made in reckless
disregard for the truth. See United States v. Kyllo, No. Cr. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL
125594, *5 (D. Or. Mar. 15, 1996) (stating holding). The district court concluded
that no warrant was required before the thermal scan. See id. at *2. The district
court therefore found probable cause to issue the warrant and denied the motion
to suppress. See id. at *5 (noting procedural history). Kyllo subsequently appealed
the district court's opinion to the Ninth Circuit, which held that a thermal image
11
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Overall, the Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' decisions indicate
that a significant factor in holding that thermal imaging is not a Fourth
Amendment search rests on the notion that the technology does not re-
veal details that society recognizes as private and worthy of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.53
2. Analogy to Canine Sniff
In addition to reasoning that thermal imagers are a non-intrusive
technology, courts have also analogized the use of thermal image scans to
law enforcement officers' use of trained dogs to detect illegal drugs.54 In
United States v. Place,5 5 the United States Supreme Court upheld the war-
rantless use of trained drug dogs to detect contraband in a passenger's
luggage at an airport.56 The Court held that a trained dog's sniff is not a
search because it is minimally intrusive.5 7 A United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit decision, in United States v. Solis,58 represents
another influential decision regarding canine sniffs. 59 In Solis, Customs
officers used trained dogs to verify the presence of marijuana inside a sus-
pect's trailer.60 In its holding, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a canine
scan is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047
(stating holding).
53. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1046 (noting that whether technology has been used
to aid permissible observation or to perform impermissible warrantless search de-
pends on whether technology reveals intimate details).
54. See id. (comparing thermal imaging to canine sniff); Pinson, 24 F.3d at
1058 (same); United States v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966, at *4
(M.D. Pa. 1992) (same); LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Ky.
1996) (same); State v. Niel, 671 So. 2d 1111, 1111-12 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (same);
State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (same).
55. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
56. See id. at 707 (holding canine sniff does not offend Fourth Amendment).
57. See id. (reasoning that canine sniff is minimally intrusive). The Court
stated:
A "canine sniff" by a well trained narcotics detection dog ... does not
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the
content of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is ob-
tained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a
typical physical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the
sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage,
the information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures
that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investiga-
tive methods.
Id.
58. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
59. See id. at 883 (holding canine sniff not search under Fourth Amendment).
60. See id. at 881 (detailing investigation and adjudication of defendant). In
Solis, an unreliable informant told a government drug agent that there was a white
semi-trailer parked at the rear of a gasoline station with about one ton of mari-
juana inside. See id. The informant also stated that the trailer was distinguishable
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sniff did not constitute a search because "[n] o sophisticated mechanical or
electronic devices were used [and the] ... investigation was not indiscrimi-
nate but solely directed to the particular contraband."
61
Many majority-view courts have relied upon the reasoning in canine
sniff cases to determine thermal image scans are not searches. 62 In United
States v. Pinson,6 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found the use of thermal imagers analogous to the warrantless use of po-
lice dogs that are trained to sniff and identify illegal drugs.64 The Pinson
court reasoned that "U]ust as odor escapes a compartment or building
and is detected by the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff, so
also does heat escape a home and is detected by the sense-enhancing
[thermal imager]. "65 Likewise, in State v. Niel,6 6 the Louisiana Court of
by its paper license plate and by white powder on the outside of its rear doors. See
id. The informant further stated that on at least seven occasions he had assisted a
"John Solis" (the defendant) in the unloading of large quantities of white-powder-
covered marijuana bricks from similar trailers. See id. Based on the informant's
tip, the drug agent proceeded to the designated gas station and found a white
semi-trailer with a paper license plate and the trailer appeared to have white tal-
cum powder on its rear doors. See id.
The drug agent relayed what he had learned to Customs. See id. Conse-
quently, two Customs officers took specially trained drug dogs across public prop-
erty to the trailer. See id. Each dog indicated that marijuana was located inside the
trailer. See id. The dogs noticed the odor of the marijuana, one from as far away as
twenty-five yards. See id. Each confirmed the reaction within one foot of the
trailer. See id.
On the basis of the dogs' reaction toward the trailer, a magistrate issued a
search warrant for the trailer. See id. The trailer was searched and a large amount
of marijuana was found. See id. Subsequently, Solis was indicted for three viola-
tions of Chapter 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1) for the possession with intent to distribute
marijuana and the distribution of marijuana. See id. Solis made a pretrial motion
to suppress the use of the marijuana as evidence against him. See id. None of the
conclusions presented at the hearing were disputed by the parties. See id. The
conclusions included testimony that Blue and Baron, the retrievers used as drug
detection dogs, were extremely reliable. See id. The government conceded that
prior to the use of the dogs no probable cause existed for a warrant to search the
trailer. See id.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California filed a
memorandum and order granting the suppression motion. See id. The court rea-
soned that the warrantless detection of the marijuana by the dogs constituted an
unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment and that the subsequent search of
the trailer was unlawful because the warrant authorizing it had been issued on the
basis of evidence that was the fruit of the earlier illegal search. See id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of the dogs here did
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. See id.
61. Id. at 882-83 (holding canine sniff not search under Fourth Amendment).
62. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994) (comparing
thermal image scan to canine sniff); State v. Niel, 671 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) (same).
63. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
64. See id. at 1058 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that thermal image scan is not
search under Fourth Amendment).
65. Id. at 1058.
66. 671 So. 2d 1111 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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Appeals argued that because Louisiana state courts had held that non-
intrusive canine sniffs do not violate the Fourth Amendment, thermal im-
age scans do not present Fourth Amendment concerns.
67
These majority-view courts reason that thermal imaging technology
simply detects heat escaping from a home. 68 As a result, the thermal
imager serves as the functional equivalent to a trained police dog. 69 Con-
sequently, majority-view courts hold that if a canine sniff is constitutional,
then a thermal image scan also does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 70
3. Analogy to Discarded Garbage
Another line of reasoning that courts often follow is that a thermal
image scan detects waste heat.7 1 By characterizing the heat emitted from
a home as waste, the courts assert that cases involving discarded garbage
provide controlling legal authority on this issue.7 2 In California v. Green-
wood,73 the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless garbage
inspection by police does not violate the Fourth Amendment.74 In Green-
67. See id. at 1111-12 (holding thermal image scan is not search under Fourth
Amendment). In Niel, the Louisiana Court of Appeals considered whether a ther-
mal imaging scan was a search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See id. The case was heard on appeal from a denial of the defen-
dant's application for post-conviction relief. See id.
The court denied the defendant's appeal on two grounds. See id. First, there
were factors, in addition to the evidence of abnormally high readings from the
thermal imager, that contributed to a finding of probable cause. See id. Second,
the thermal image scan was not an illegal search. See id. (stating thermal imager
did not reveal intimate details of home). The court determined that a thermal
image scan was constitutional because cases involving police use of trained drug
dogs did not present any constitutional concerns in Louisiana. See id. ("[A]s in
cases where Louisiana courts have approved the use of drug detection dogs, the
utilization of a [thermal imaging] device was nonintrusive.").
68. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058 (comparing thermal imaging to canine sniffs);
see also United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
2000 WL 267066 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-8508) (stating that thermal image
scan simply "indicated that seemingly anomalous waste heat was radiating from the
outside surface of the home, much like a trained police dog would be used to
indicate that an object was emitting the odor of illicit drugs").
69. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058 (finding thermal imaging device analogous to
drug detection dogs) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
70. Compare id. (holding use of thermal imaging device analogous to use of
drug detection dogs), and Niel, 671 So. 2d at 1111-12 (holding that thermal imager
scan is comparable to canine sniff), with Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (stating that canine
sniff is sui generis).
71. See McKnight, supra note 2, at 1255-56 (discussing cases which employ
waste heat theory).
72. See United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (comparing
waste heat to discarded garbage); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir.
1994) (same); Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058 (same).
73. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
74. See id. at 40-41 (holding no Fourth Amendment violation where police
rummaged through discarded garbage). The Court held that the seizure of
Greenwood's garbage bags left at the curb would be a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion "only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their
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wood, the police used evidence discovered in Greenwood's garbage to ob-
tain a search warrant for his home. 75 The Court reasoned that
constitutional protection does not arise "unless society is prepared to ac-
cept that expectation as objectively reasonable." 76 Because the Court
found that society does not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy
in garbage exposed to the public, garbage is not afforded constitutional
protection under the Fourth Amendment. 77
In United States v. Ford,78 the Eleventh Circuit relied on precedent that
held an individual did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in gar-
bage intentionally exposed to the public. 79 Similarly, in United States v.
Myers,80 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that just as society is unwilling to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in garbage left by the curbside and in smoke rising from a chim-
garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable." Id. at 39. Greenwood did
not disagree with that standard, but he asserted that he did have an expectation of
privacy in his trash. See id. His trash, he explained, was only temporarily at the
curb and would be deposited at the garbage dump with little likelihood that it
would be inspected by anyone. See id. The Court accepted the personal privacy
expectation of Greenwood under those circumstances, as well as Greenwood's be-
lief that his trash would not become known to the police or the public. See id.
(noting Greenwood's expectation of privacy in his trash).
The Court, however, imposed an important condition on that privacy expecta-
tion if Fourth Amendment protection was to be justified. See id. at 39-40 (recogniz-
ing limits on expectation of privacy). The Court explained that constitutional
protection does not arise "unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as
objectively reasonable." Id. The Court concluded that Greenwood exposed his
garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat his Fourth Amendment claim. See id. at
40. The Court notes in support of its conclusion that curbside trash is readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the pub-
lic. See id. Furthermore, the Court noted that the trash was put at the curb for
"the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might
himself have sorted through... [Greenwood's] trash or permitted others, such as
the police, to do so." Id. The Court held that Greenwood did not have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the incriminating evidence he discarded in his trash.
See id. at 41. That trash was therefore not subject to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. See id. at 40 (holding Greenwood's exposure of trash to public defeated
Fourth Amendment claim).
75. See id. at 38 (stating facts of Greenwood). In Greenwood, the defendant had
placed his trash at curbside for collection. See id. at 37. A trash collector picked up
the trash and turned the bags over to the police. See id. A search of the bags
revealed evidence of drug activity, which officers used to secure a warrant to search
the defendant's home. See id. at 37-38. The search produced cocaine and hashish.
See id. at 38.
76. See id. at 39-40 (stating that in addition to Greenwood's subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, society must recognize expectation of privacy in discarded trash to
implicate Fourth Amendment protection).
77. See id. at 41-42 (stating that society does not recognize expectation of pri-
vacy in discarded trash).
78. 34 F.3d 992 (l1th Cir. 1994).
79. See id. at 996-97 (citing United States Supreme Court precedent as basis
for holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat emitted from
home).
80. 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
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ney, society is also unwilling to recognize an expectation of privacy in the
waste heat emitted from a home. 8 1
These majority-view courts have characterized Greenwood's discarded
garbage as legally equivalent to waste heat emitted as a result of indoor
marijuana cultivation. 8 2 This argument rests on the fact that marijuana
growers often intentionally vent excess heat outside their homes using fans
and air conditioning units.8 3 Because society does not recognize as rea-
sonable an individual's expectation of privacy in garbage voluntarily ex-
posed to the public, a thermal imager detection of heat waste is not
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.8 4
4. Plain-View Analogy
Several majority-view courts have reasoned that when law enforce-
ment officers use a thermal imager to measure the heat emanating from a
home, they are merely detecting that which is in plain view.85 Although
81. See id. at 670 (holding thermal image scan is not search under Fourth
Amendment). In Myers, the Indiana State Police set up an undercover business
designed to attract and identify marijuana growers. See id. at 668. The business
sold indoor gardening products used by marijuana growers. See id. Dale E. Myers
attracted the investigators' attention because he inquired about other technology
used by marijuana growers. See id. Based on these events, the police decided to
investigate Myers further. See id. The police focused on Myers' electrical usage
because indoor cultivation of marijuana requires high-voltage indoor lighting. See
id. The investigation by the police revealed that Myers' electrical usage was unusu-
ally high in non-summer months. See id. The police also conducted surveillance of
Myers' home and discovered that Myers had not left any garbage out for three
weeks. See id. The police believed that Myers did not leave any garbage at the
curbside because he was disposing of marijuana clippings. See id. at 668-69.
In light of this evidence, the police also performed thermal imaging scanning
of Myers' residence. See id. The scan performed on Myers' residence revealed
inordinate amounts of heat, indicating the use of indoor lights associated with
marijuana cultivation. See id. Based on the results from the thermal imaging and
the other evidence gathered up to that point, the police obtained a search warrant
for Myers' home. See id. The search of Myers' residence uncovered growing and
processed marijuana plants and various items of growing equipment. See id. Sub-
sequently, Myers was indicted for manufacturing marijuana and possessing mari-
juana with intent to distribute. See id.
Myers moved to suppress the evidence obtained during this search, claiming
that the warrant was invalid because it was issued based on the results of an uncon-
stitutional thermal imaging scan. See id. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana denied Myers' motion to suppress. See id. (ruling on
motion to suppress). Myers then pleaded guilty and appealed his motion to sup-
press to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See id. (noting
disposition of case).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994)
(comparing waste heat to discarded garbage); Ford, 34 F.3d at 997 (same).
83. See, e.g., Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057-58 (discussing how defendants vented ex-
cess heat to maintain proper growing temperature).
84. See Myers, 46 F.3d at 670 (holding thermal image scan not search under
Fourth Amendment).
85. See Ford, 34 F.3d at 996-98 (applying plain-view doctrine to thermal imag-
ing); United States v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
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this doctrine has traditionally been limited to situations where officers dis-
cover something in plain view, visually, with their natural senses, courts
have extended the doctrine to thermal imaging cases involving heat, a me-
dium which is not detected visually.86
These majority-view courts have compared the use of a thermal
imager to an aerial-mapping camera.8 7 In United States v. Dow Chemical
Co.,8 8 the United States Supreme Court held that a government agency's
aerial photographs of an industrial plant taken with a highly sophisticated
mapping camera located in navigable airspace did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.8 9 In Dow Chemical, the Court reasoned that no search oc-
July 27, 1992) (same) (citing court's reasoning found in United States v. Solis, 563
F.2d 880, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1976)), affd, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993).
86. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989) (holding that law enforce-
ment officers did not "search" defendant's greenhouse, which was missing ceiling
panel, when they flew over structure and observed marijuana growing operation
because this activity was subject to observation by general flying public); California
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-42 (1988) (holding that defendant did not have
reasonable expectation of privacy in curbside garbage left for pickup because he
risked exposing contents of garbage to snoops, animals and mischievous children);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that because defendant
risked exposing his marijuana garden to general flying public, police officers were
not "searching" when they flew over his property and observed growing crops);
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (ruling that defendant travel-
ing in automobile had no expectation of privacy in his movements because he
voluntarily conveyed his movements to anyone who wanted to look); Smith v. Ma-
ryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979) (holding that defendant relinquished his ex-
pectation of privacy in telephone numbers when he dialed by risking their
exposure to telephone company).
87. See, e.g., Ford, 34 F.3d at 996-97 (discussing Court's decision in Dow). The
court in Ford compared the FLIR to an aerial mapping camera used to photograph
a manufacturing facility. See id. at 996. The Ford court stated that the thermal
images, like the photographs taken by the mapping camera, did not penetrate any
walls and were incapable of "revealing the intimacy of detail and activity protected
by the Fourth Amendment." Id. The court also discussed the principles set forth
in Florida v. Riley. See id. (stating aerial photography did not reveal intimate details
of home (citing Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 (holding that what officers observe from
legal vantage point will not amount to Fourth Amendment search))).
88. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
89. See id. at 239 (stating facts of Dow Chemical). In Dow Chemical, the Court
considered whether the EPA's aerial photography of Dow's plant with a mapmak-
ing camera mounted on an airplane flying within navigable airspace was a search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 229 (describing facts of case).
Dow contended that the photographs violated the Fourth Amendment because
the EPA took photographs of the "industrial curtilage," and Dow had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that area. See id. at 232-33. Dow conceded that photo-
graphs taken from a nearby hillside, or naked-eye observation from a simple fly-
over, would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 234.
The Court first addressed Dow's contention that the "industrial curtilage"
around Dow's plant commanded the same constitutional protection as the curti-
lage of a private home. See id. at 235 (considering whether industrial curtilage is
protected under the Fourth Amendment). Dow contended that the Court should
regard Dow's 2000-acre plant as industrial curtilage because Dow took all reasona-
ble precautions to prevent access from the ground level. See id. at 236 (stating Dow
argued that he barred access on ground level). The Court concluded that the
2001]
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curred because the equipment, although enhanced to some degree, was
generally available to the public, and the flight was conducted in navigable
airspace.90 The Court noted, however, that to "hear and record confiden-
tial discussions of chemical formulae or other trade secrets would raise
very different and far more serious questions."
9 1
Several majority-view courts have applied the Dow Chemical Court's
holding that a thermal image scan is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 92 For example, in United States v. Ishmael,9 3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a thermal image scan did
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the device
was used in an open field and, thus, officers were entitled to observe the
defendant's building.9 4 The Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that a ther-
plant area fell somewhere between "open fields" and curtilage with regard to the
privacy interest, the Court would accord the plant area. See id. at 236-37. The
Court noted that the government's surveillance of private property with highly so-
phisticated devices might be constitutionally prohibited, but concluded that the
mapmaking camera that the EPA used did not supply sufficient detail to raise con-
stitutional concerns. See id. at 238-39 (stating photos did not reveal intimate de-
tails, thus they did not violate Fourth Amendment). Because the plant area did
not command as high a privacy interest as a curtilage, and the mapmaking camera
did not reveal too much intimate detail, the Court concluded that Dow did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in protecting the plant area from aerial
photographs of this type. See id. at 235-39 (noting that if photos had revealed
intimate details there would be Fourth Amendment protection).
Justice Powell noted that the majority did not explicitly follow the Katz analy-
sis. See id. at 244, 247 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stat-
ing that Court does not reject Katz standard). Justice Powell then applied the Katz
test. See id. at 247-52 (analyzing case using Katz). Justice Powell first concluded
that trade secret laws indicated that society will accept as reasonable Dow's privacy
interest in its open air plant area. See id. at 248-49 (concluding that as long as Dow
attempts to protect trade secrets, law will recognize expectation of privacy as rea-
sonable). Justice Powell rejected the majority's reliance on the "open fields" doc-
trine. See id. at 250 (stating that open fields doctrine is not relevant). Justice
Powell also criticized the majority's opinion for relying on the trespass doctrine
that Katz repudiated. See id. at 252 (disapproving of trespass theory). Because the
photographs infringed on Dow's expectation of privacy that society has recognized
as legitimate, the EPA's taking of photographs without a warrant violated the
Fourth Amendment. See id. (stating majority's decision was consistent with Fourth
Amendment).
90. See id. at 238 (holding aerial mapping not search under Fourth
Amendment).
91. Id. at 239.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing thermal image scan is not search under Fourth Amendment).
93. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
94. See id. at 856-57 (stating that when thermal imager is used in open field
there is no Fourth Amendment violation). In Ishmael, a confidential source in-
formed Paul Black, a DEA officer, that he had delivered numerous truckloads of
concrete re-mix to the Ishmael's secluded, rural property in Nacogdoches County,
Texas in the summer of 1992. See id. at 851. Rohn Ishmael took measures to
conceal the need for the concrete by manually mixing the concrete near the
source's truck and then driving the concrete to another location on the property.
See id.
258 [Vol. 46: p. 241
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mal imager is the functional equivalent of an X-ray machine that allows
After a hiatus in the investigation, Black resumed his investigation in August
of 1993. See id. (stating facts of case). He and three other officers returned to the
property and observed about sixty empty bags of cement, a dump truck and a
concrete re-mixer. See id. The next day, Black discovered Rohn Ishmael's criminal
record included a conviction for the cultivation of marijuana. See id. Black sur-
veyed the Ishmaels' property by air and observed a mobile home and a large steel
building separated by 200 to 300 yards. See id. Black discovered that the Ishmaels
had built a structure beneath the steel building. See id. The substructure was wired
for electricity and was being fed water from a nearby pond by way of exposed
rubber tubes and a water pump. See id. The substructure also had an exhaust fan,
which was continuously running. See id. Black also observed a nearby pallet con-
taining 100 five-gallon plastic buckets. See id. Suspecting that the Ishmaels were
cultivating marijuana in the structure beneath the steel building, DEA officers
boarded a helicopter with a thermal imager and flew over the Ishmaels' property
at approximately 500 to 1000 feet. See id.
The DEA's scan of the Ishmaels' property showed that, although the water
entering the substructure was noticeably cool, the water exiting it was emitting a
substantial amount of heat. See id. at 852. The recording also showed that the
ground adjacent to the substructure was much warmer than the ground further
from the substructure. See id. The Ishmaels' telephone records indicated that the
Ishmaels had made numerous calls to various horticulture shops, two of which
appeared on a narcotics intelligence computer base as suppliers for marijuana cul-
tivators. See id. Black also subpoenaed the Ishmaels' electrical utility records,
which showed that the substructure's power usage was extremely high and far ex-
ceeded the mobile home's power usage. See id.
In September, 1993, Black used a hand-held thermal imager which made simi-
lar findings. See id. (stating facts of case). DEA thermographers concluded that
the Ishmaels were illegally cultivating marijuana. See id. Based on this information
Black obtained a warrant to search the steel building and its substructure on the
Ishmaels' property. See id. The officers executed the warrant and found 770 mari-
juana plants and several firearms. See id.
In October, 1993, the Ishmaels were indicted. See id. (discussing facts of case).
They later moved to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search war-
rant, arguing that the readings from the thermal imager constituted an unconstitu-
tional search and that, without those readings, the DEA did not have probable
cause to obtain a warrant. See id.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the
motion to suppress in February, 1994. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp.
205, 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994). In particular, the court rejected the plain-view argu-
ment on the ground that the heat emissions would not be in plain view without the
use of the thermal imager. See id. at 212 (noting thermal images were not in plain
view). Thus, the district court concluded that the use of the thermal imager con-
stituted a search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. See id. (recognizing that
search offended Fourth Amendment because heat was not in plain view). Next,
the court proceeded to determine whether the remaining evidence amounted to
probable cause. See id. at 213-14. The court noted that the DEA had no direct
evidence of illegal activity taking place on the Ishmaels' property. See id. The
court stated, "The evidence of their activity was consistent with developing a new
patented strain of African violets, and innumerable other perfectly legal activities."
Id. at 214. On this basis, the court concluded that a judge would not find that
probable cause existed for issuing a warrant, and it therefore granted the Ishmaels'
motion to suppress. See id. The government appealed the district court's holdings
to the Fifth Circuit. See Ishmae4 48 F.3d at 852 (addressing district court's
decision).
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the police to see inside a structure. 95 The court instead asserted that as
long as the law enforcement agents were lawfully present on Ishmael's
property, the use of the thermal imager did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation.
9 6
Although majority-view courts have compared thermal image scans to
other constitutionally permissible police conduct, the variety of ap-
proaches taken by majority-view courts underscores the challenge of ana-
lyzing new technologies in accordance with old legal frameworks.
9 7
B. The Minority View
Despite the majority view, several courts have determined that ther-
mal imaging constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 98 These
courts focus on the intrusive nature of this technology.99 Minority-view
courts also focus on the individual's expectation of privacy in the activities
conducted within the home, rather than on the expectation of privacy in
the heat emitted from the residence. 10 0 The analysis concentrates on the
95. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 856 (discussing defendant's argument that thermal
image scan constitutes search under Fourth Amendment). The court responded
that a thermal imager presents "no greater intrusion on one's property than a
precise mapping camera, an electric beeper or a pen register," which have all
passed constitutional muster. Id.
96. See id. at 856-57 (arguing that law enforcement officials were lawfully pre-
sent and use of thermal imager did not alter conclusion that search did not violate
Fourth Amendment). The district court, in Ishmael, characterized that structure as
a business and, therefore, the Fifth Circuit was bound by the district court's factual
conclusion. See id. (stating that Fifth Circuit could only review for clear error). As
a result, the officers were entitled to go as "close to the structure as necessary to
look inside without physically entering." Id at 857 (quoting United States v. Pace,
955 F.2d 270, 276 (5th Cir. 1992)). Because there was no recognized concept of
business curtilage, the Ishmaels could not assert that the police failed to conduct
the thermal image scan in an open field. See id. (finding use of thermal image scan
was constitutional).
97. See McKnight, supra note 2, at 1259 (noting that courts are straining to put
"square peg in a circle" by employing various analogies).
98. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing thermal image scan constitutes search), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247
(10th Cir. 1996); Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 906 (Pa. 1999)
(same); State v. Siegal; 934 P.2d 176, 180 (Mont. 1997) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, State v. Kuneff, 970 F.2d 556 (Mont. 1998); State v. Young, 867 P.2d at
601, 604 (Wash. 1994) (same); State v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th at 1224, 1232
(1994) (same).
99. See Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 901-02 (stating that thermal imagers reveal
intimate details within home).
100. See generally Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1501 (stating that expectation of pri-
vacy is in activities that produce heat signature that thermal imager can detect);
Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 903 (same); Young, 867 P.2d at 604 (same); Deutsch, 44
Cal. App. 4th at 1236 (same). Minority-view courts prefer to analogize a thermal
imager to a beeper that is used to track the movements of a suspect. See, e.g.,
Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 905-06 (comparing thermal imager to beeper).
260
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indoor activities that generate heat.10 1 In particular, the analysis focuses
on the indoor activities that create the heat signature detected by a ther-
mal imager.1 0 2 A minority-view analysis contrasts with the analysis of some
of the majority courts, which center their analyses on the heat escaping
from the home.
10 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Gindelsperge, 10 4
reiterated the guiding principle for minority-view courts when it asserted,
"Courts that have ...found the use of thermal imaging devices to be
constitutionally repugnant have done so based upon the conclusion that
these devices do, in fact, reveal intimate details occurring within the sanc-
tity of the home, the place deserving the utmost protection pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment.
1 0 5
101. See Colbridge, supra note 1, at 21-23 (identifying heat source as focus of
analysis).
102. For a discussion of thermal imaging and how the technology works, see
supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text. As the Cusumano court argued, the im-
age created by the thermal imager can be detailed enough to depict the activities
within the home. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1501 (distinguishing between waste
heat and heat signature). The Cusumano court further argued that focusing on the
waste heat rather than the heat signature ignores the purpose of the device. See id.
(rejecting waste heat principle). In particular, the court stated "[u]nder optimal
conditions-viewing through an open window into a darkened room, for exam-
ple-the imager ... might well be able to resolve these heat signatures into some-
what indistinct images." Id. The court in Young also noted a thermal imager's
capacity. See Young, 867 P.2d at 595 (noting imager detects surface temperature
differences). A thermal imager, it was argued, could detect a human form
through a curtained window under certain circumstances. See id. (remarking that
imager could detect person through window if he or she leaned against curtain).
103. See United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995) (examining
defendant's expectation of privacy in heat emitted from home); United States v.
Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (l1th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d
1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
104. 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999).
105. Id. at 901-02. In Gindlesperger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
a thermal image scan constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
906. In 1994, police officers entered the basement area of Gregory Gindles-
perger's residence pursuant to a search warrant and seized approximately twenty-
one marijuana plants. See id. at 898. Probable cause for the search was based on
information provided by a confidential informant that marijuana was being culti-
vated. See id. at 898-99. The police confirmed this information through a thermal
imager scan. See id. at 899. The search warrant was based, in part, on the fact that
"[t]his heat source would be consistent with the heat source coming from the arti-
ficial lighting used in the growing of marijuana." Id. Gindlesperger's home was
then searched and police found artificial lighting equipment as well as marijuana
plants in the basement. See id. He was arrested and charged with various violations
of Pennsylvania's drug laws. See id. Gindlesperger was found guilty of all the
charges against him, and on appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed
the trial court's order denying Gindlesperger's suppression motion. See id.
Although Gindlesperger asserted a state constitutional challenge to law en-
forcement's warrantless use of a thermal imager to scan his residence, the court
concluded that such use violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 906 n.3. Thus,
the court did not address Gindlesperger's state constitutional claim. See id. (stating
state constitutional claim not at issue). The court concluded that it only needed to
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Similarly, in State v. Young,10 6 the Washington Supreme Court held
that a thermal image scan constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.10 7 The Young court rejected the garbage and canine sniff analo-
gies.' 0 8 The court noted that a thermal image scan cannot be compared
to discarded garbage. 10 9 Unlike when a person discards garbage, a person
does not foresee other people using sophisticated instruments to detect
waste heat."10 The court noted that a thermal imager "produces an image
of the interior of the home that otherwise is protected by the home's walls
... [this] allows the government to intrude into the defendant's home
and gather information about what occurs there.""' According to the
court, "[i]t is this reasonable expectation of privacy in the home that is
violated by warrantless infrared surveillance, not the expectation of privacy
in 'heat waste"' as majority-view courts assert. 12
Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court found the canine sniff anal-
ogy unconvincing. 1 3 The court held that canine sniffs could not be com-
pared to thermal image scans in that canine sniffs are unique because they
detect the existence or non-existence of illegal drugs. 114 Even if appropri-
ate, the court reasoned that "the use of a trained dog to sniff for narcotics
outside the defendant's apartment door constituted a search" that violated
the Fourth Amendment. 115 In rejecting the analogies posited by other
address whether the conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because if the con-
duct violates the United States Constitution, such conduct would violate Penn-
sylvania's version of the Fourth Amendment. See id.
106. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
107. See id. at 601 (holding thermal image scan violated Fourth Amendment).
The precedential value of the court's opinion is limited because the court did not
reach the issue whether the thermal image scan constituted a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See id. (stating surveillance violates Art. I, § 7 of Constitution,
therefore court did not address possible violation of Fourth Amendment). The
court only addressed the Fourth Amendment in order to "provid[e] guidance to
other courts on the subject of sense-enhanced surveillance of a home .... " Id.
108. See id. at 601-03 (discussing thermal image scans).
109. See id. at 602-03 (discussing garbage analogy).
110. See id. at 603 (arguing garbage analogy fails when applied to thermal
imagers).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. (discussing garbage analogy).
114. See id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
115. Id. at 603 (holding that canine sniffs of private residences constitute
Fourth Amendment search). The Washington State Supreme Court relied on
United States v. Thomas, in which the court noted that:
[w] ith a trained dog police may obtain information about what is inside a
dwelling that they could not derive from the use of their own senses.
Consequently, the officers' use of a dog is not a mere improvement of
their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a signifi-
cant enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory
instrument.
757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985).
Based on this reasoning, the Second Circuit found that the defendant "had a
legitimate expectation that the contents of his closed apartment would remain pri-
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courts, the Washington Supreme Court shifted the analysis away from an
individual's expectation of privacy in heat and placed the focus on an indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy in the home.1 1 6
Additionally, in United States v. Cusumano,l" 7 and People v. Deutsch,1 18
the courts held that thermal imaging was intrusive and violative of the
Fourth Amendment." 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Cusumano directly challenged the reasoning employed by major-
ity-view courts when it declared, "Our fellow circuits [have] . . . misappre-
hended the most pernicious of the device's capabilities .... [A] thermal
imager intrudes upon the privacy of the home... because the interpreta-
tion of that data allows the government to monitor those domestic activi-
ties that generate a significant amount of heat."120 Thus, according to the
Tenth Circuit, a thermal image scan "strips the sanctuary of the home of
one vital dimension of its security: the 'right to be let alone' from the
arbitrary and discretionary monitoring of our actions by government offi-
cials."' 21 In Deutsch, the California Court of Appeals agreed with the
Tenth Circuit's rationale.' 22 The court noted that "[p]recisely because
the thermal imager is indiscriminate in registering sources of heat it is an
intrusive tool, which tells much about the activities inside the home which
may be quite unrelated to any illicit activity."1 23
As a result of this perspective, minority-view courts apply a fundamen-
tally different analysis under the reasonable expectation of privacy test
than majority-view courts. 124 Minority-view courts understand the privacy
vate .... [Thus,] because of [the] defendant['s] heightened expectation of pri-
vacy inside his dwelling, the canine sniff at his door constituted a search." Id.
116. See Young, 867 P.2d at 604 (stating that courts treat searches and seizures
in public places differently than searches and seizures occurring in home).
117. 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th
Cir. 1996).
118. 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1227 (1996).
119. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1506 (finding thermal imaging technology in-
trusive). Although a Tenth Circuit panel in Cusumano found that the warrantless
use of a thermal imager violated the Fourth Amendment, the court sitting en banc
vacated the decision and decided the case without reaching the constitutional is-
sue. See Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, one com-
mentator has described the Tenth Circuit's opinion as "[t]he most exhaustive and
compelling analysis" of the issue. WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.2 (3d ed.
1999).
120. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1504.
121. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
122. See Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th at 1229 (analyzing Cusumano).
123. Id. at 1231.
124. See generally United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994)(holding that thermal image scan constitutes search under Fourth Amendment);
People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224 (1996) (same). Both Gindlesperger and
Young relied on arguments also presented in both Field and Deutsch. See Field, 855
F. Supp. at 1518-19 (discussing arguments raised by government that thermal
imager is no more intrusive than dog sniff); Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th at 1228-31
(addressing argument over intrusiveness of thermal imaging).
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issue to be whether the individual subject to the thermal image scan had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the heat generating activities within
the home. 125 By focusing on the home, these courts uniformly find both
that individuals have an actual expectation of privacy in the home and that
society recognizes this expectation as reasonable.
1 26
In contrast to majority-view courts, minority-view courts analogize a
thermal imager to a beeper used to track the movements of a suspect.
1 27
In United States v. Karo,128 the United States Supreme Court considered
"whether the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not
open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence." 129 The
Court held that use of the electronic device without a warrant violated the
Fourth Amendment. 130 More importantly, the Court asserted that use of
the beeper, although less intrusive than a full blown search, nevertheless
"reveal[ed] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Gov-
ernment is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have
otherwise obtained without a warrant.' 131
Accordingly, courts that focus on the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in heat generating activities in the home determine that a thermal
image scan constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. 132
125. See Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. 1999)
(holding "that the proper focus of our inquiry should be on whether Appellee was
able to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the heat-generating ac-
tivities occurring within his home").
126. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 575 (1980) (prohibiting police
from making warrantless and nonconsensual entry into suspect's home in order to
make arrest). In Payton, the United States Supreme Court asserted that courts
must treat searches of the home differently than searches in public places. See id.
at 587 (delineating difference in treatment of search of home and search in pub-
lic). Additionally, the Court in Silverman v. United States recognized a person's
right to retreat into his or her home to be free from unreasonable government
intrusion. See 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (discussing person's protections in his or
her home). The Court in United States v. Karo also recognized that there is a sub-
jective and objective expectation of privacy in the home. See 468 U.S. at 714 (ac-
knowledging expectations of privacy in home). The Court said that:
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free from government in-
trusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one
that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.
Id. Based on these decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized that the home
deserves more, if not the most, Fourth Amendment protections.
127. See Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 906 (finding analogy of thermal imager to
beeper used in Karo applicable); Young, 867 P.2d at 602 (same).
128. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
129. Id. at 714.
130. See id. at 715 (stating holding).
131. Id. (holding that use of electronic beeper violated Fourth Amendment);
see also Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 906 (same).
132. See Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 898 (examining defendant's expectation of
privacy in activities within home). See generally Young, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (Wash.
1994) (same); State v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232 (1994) (same).
[Vol. 46: p. 241
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Critique of Majority-View Analogies
Many majority-view courts analogize the use of thermal imagers to
other kinds of law enforcement activities that have been upheld as consti-
tutional.1 3 3 Majority-view courts assert that thermal imaging is not a
search because it is non-intrusive.1 3 4 Also, majority-view courts have based
their decisions on cases involving canine sniffs, discarded garbage and the
plain-view doctrine.1 35 An analysis of the majority-view courts' decisions
reveals concerns about the applicability of majority-view analogies to ther-
mal image scans.
1. Thermal Imaging Is an Intrusive Technology
Courts concluding that a thermal imager does not intrude into the
privacy and sanctity of a home fail to address several shortcomings of this
approach. 136 Primarily, a thermal imager can, under certain circum-
stances, detect the presence of an individual standing in a window where
the blinds are drawn or behind a wall where the wood is thin.137 Further-
more, an assertion that a thermal imager does not detect activities within a
home belies the very purpose of the device. 138 On the contrary, thermal
imagers have been known to produce clear images that reveal exact de-
tails. 139 For example, thermal imagers can detect the contours of an indi-
vidual's body.140 Finally, thermal imagers can also detect body heat
133. For a discussion of analogies drawn by majority-view courts, see supra
notes 46-97 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of thermal imaging as a non-intrusive technology, see
supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion comparing thermal imaging to canine sniffs, garbage
and objects in plain-view, see supra notes 54-97 and accompanying text.
136. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (stat-
ing that majority-view court misapprehended most intrusive capabilities of device
where machine intrudes upon privacy of home because data allows government to
monitor domestic activities that generate significant amount of heat), rev'd on other
grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
137. See Laba, supra note 17, at 1465 n.170 (citing Young, 867 P.2d at 594).
138. See generally United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531 (W.D. Wis.
1994) (noting that thermal imagers can detect tear ducts on face); State v. Young,
867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (noting that thermal imagers can detect "a human
form through an open [curtained] window when the person is leaning against
[the] curtain" or when person is leaning against plywood door).
139. See Lanning, supra note 14, at 1773 (describing capabilities of FLIR
technology).
140. See Charles Stanley, Infrared Tool Helps Cops Stay Out of Dark, CHI. TmB.,
July 26, 1994, at 3 (stating FLIRs revealed detailed image of eyeglasses and facial
hair). Some FLIR are sensitive enough to detect a heartbeat. See Laba, supra note
17, at 1465 (discussing potential sensitivity of FLIR).
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through a thin partition. 14 1 Thus, the capabilities of this technology indi-
cate that more intimate details than waste heat can be detected.142
When analyzing the capabilities of thermal imaging, majority-view
courts improperly focus on waste heat and an individual's expectation of
privacy in waste heat.143 Rather, these courts should appreciate the de-
gree to which thermal imaging goes beyond a simple detection of heat.14 4
Such a consideration would move these courts toward providing greater
Fourth Amendment protections in this area. 14 5
2. Canine Sniffs Are Distinguishable from Thermal Image Scans
The majority-view's reliance on the analogy of a thermal imager to a
canine sniff is flawed for several reasons. 146 A primary flaw is that a canine
sniff only detects the existence of narcotics.147 A canine sniff is limited,
but a thermal image scan detects all sources of heat, both legal and ille-
gal. 1 48 Furthermore, even if the canine sniff analogy were valid, canine
sniffs have been considered searches when conducted at an individual's
home. 149 In these circumstances, a thermal image scan of a private resi-
141. See Lanning, supra note 14, at 1773 (describing thermal imaging
technology).
142. For a discussion of the capabilities of thermal imagers, see supra notes
12-22 and accompanying text.
143. See McKnight, supra note 2, at 1254 (noting that court holding thermal
image scan is search finds that proper focus is on heat generating activities that
occur within home, rather than heat escaping from home).
144. See id. (stating that true worth of thermal imager to government is predi-
cated upon translation of heat reading into information about activities within
home that generated heat).
145. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
that "more sophisticated forms of technology increase the likelihood that their
warrantless use will constitute an unreasonable intrusion").
146. For a discussion of the majority-view's analogy of thermal imaging to ca-
nine sniffs, see supra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
147. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating that canine
sniff reveals only presence or absence of drugs). As one commentator has noted, a
canine sniff is limited in its capacity to search, whereas a "FLIR scan . . . reveal [s]
information about the house and its occupants that is not illegal." Lanning, supra
note 14, at 1801. A trained canine reacts only to the presence or absence of drugs,
while a FLIR reveals any source of heat. See Steele, supra note 12, at 31 (comparing
abilities of trained dog versus FLIR). Because there is nothing inherently illegal
about anomalous sources of heat, law enforcement should not be able to infer the
occurrence of illegal activity. See id. (suggesting limitations on inferences drawn
from detected heat).
148. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (stating that canine sniff is uniquely limited).
The court in Place discussed canine sniffs as an investigatory tool for law enforce-
ment and noted that there is "no other investigative procedure that is so limited
both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure." Id.
149. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603-04 (Wash. 1994) (stating that even if
canine sniff analogy was valid, Place and Solis are distinguishable). The court relied
on the reasoning in United States v. Thomas. See 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985). In
Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
266 [Vol. 46: p. 241
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dence must be considered a Fourth Amendment search. 15 0 Considering
the heightened expectation of privacy in the home and the uncertain na-
ture of thermal imaging technology, the canine analogy presents serious
concerns.15 1
3. Waste Heat Is Distinguishable from Discarded Trash
The analogy that thermal imaging detects waste heat, which, like gar-
bage, is undeserving of constitutional protection, also presents con-
cerns. 152 The Greenwood Court posited that, when an individual places
garbage at the curb, there is a foreseeable risk that others could rummage
through the trash. 15 3 An individual, however, cannot realistically expect
others to use sophisticated technology to detect the waste heat emanating
from his or her home.15 4
The Supreme Court in Greenwood reasoned that if an individual is con-
cerned about privacy in his or her garbage, he or she may simply avoid
placing private information in the garbage.' 55 Alternatively, the only way
to avoid the risk of intrusion in the case of a thermal imager would be to
turn off all heat sources in the home.' 56 In addition, one could not stand
near an open window or any part of the home constructed of thin mate-
use of a trained dog to sniff for narcotics outside the defendant's apartment door
constituted a search that, absent a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. See
id. at 1367 (holding canine sniff constituted search). The Thomas court attached
significance both to the method of sensory enhancement and to the fact that a
private residence was at issue. See id. at 1367-68 (emphasizing that canine sense of
smell is significant enhancement of officer's ability to detect drugs).
The Washington Supreme Court in Young found the reasoning in Thomas
compelling and stated that "[t]he Thomas court correctly recognized that when a
private dwelling is the object of a search, and the means used reveal more than
what a person can be said to knowingly expose, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment are triggered." Young, 867 P.2d at 604. The Young court maintained
that, based on this analysis, "[w]hen the police use sense-enhancing devices to ob-
tain information from someone's home that could not be obtained by unaided
observation of the exterior, they should have a search warrant." Id. (citing United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984)).
150. See Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367 (holding use of trained dog to sniff for
narcotics outside defendant's apartment door constituted search).
151. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (holding home has higher expectation of pri-
vacy); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 575 (1980) (same).
152. For a discussion of the majority-view's analogy of waste heat to garbage
discarded outside a person's home, see supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
153. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-42 (1988) (holding that de-
fendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in curbside garbage left for
pickup because he risked exposing contents of garbage to snoops, animals and
mischievous children).
154. See id. (discussing risks involved when discarding garbage).
155. See id. (discussing rationale behind holding no expectation of privacy in
discarded garbage).
156. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994) (discussing discarded
garbage analogy).
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rial, such as plywood, because a thermal imager could detect the individ-
ual's presence. 157
The Washington Supreme Court, in Young,158 identified another
problem with the garbage analogy.1 59 The court noted that a more impor-
tant distinction between discarded garbage and the images produced by a
thermal imager is that the only value of the waste heat is the information
that it discloses about the interior of the home. 160 A thermal imager, the
court concluded, "allows the government to intrude into the defendant's
home and gather information about what occurs there."' 61 The minority-
view analysis, unlike the majority-view approach, requires exploration of
the exact nature of thermal imaging as well as the extent to which it goes
beyond the mere detection of excess heat.162
4. Waste Heat Is Not in Plain View
Many majority-view courts often look to plain-view cases to justify
holding that a thermal image scan is not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 16 3 The plain-view analogy, however, is misguided
because thermal heat emissions are invisible to the naked eye and can be
detected only through the use of highly sophisticated technology.' 6 4 The
plain-view doctrine is based on an officer's ability to observe something
without the aid of technological enhancements. 165
157. See id. (explaining capabilities of thermal imagers).
158. For a further discussion of Young, see supra notes 159-62 and accompa-
nying text.
159. See id. at 602-03 (criticizing majority-view's comparison of thermal imag-
ing to discarded garbage).
160. See id. at 603 (discussing thermal imager's ability to reveal nature of activ-
ities within home).
161. See id. (determining extent to which thermal imager reveals nature of
activities within home).
162. See id at 603-04 (distinguishing waste heat from trash). Because the infra-
red device produces a heat signature, the thermal imager allows the government to
peer into and gather information about what occurs in the defendant's home. See
id. (explaining monitoring capabilities of thermal imager). Examining the cases
from this perspective would surely yield a different result. As the Supreme Court
noted in Karo, a resident has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home, "a
location not open to visual surveillance .... United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
714 (1984). It is this reasonable expectation of privacy in the home that is violated
by warrantless infrared surveillance, not the expectation of privacy in waste heat.
See id. (clarifying that reasonable expectation is in privacy of home).
163. For a discussion of majority-view cases applying the plain-view doctrine,
see infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
164. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994). The
FLIR's outstanding characteristic is that it collects energy that cannot otherwise be
detected by humans and transforms that energy into a visual image, which can be
viewed by the thermographer. See id. (discussing FLIR technology). The screen
displays the actual objects being detected, but with less definition than a standard
television. See id. (same).
165. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (stating that Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places"); see also Oliver v. Thorton, 466 U.S. 170,
[Vol. 46: p. 241
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B. The Majority View and Advanced Surveillance Technologies
The majority-view's flawed perspective will allow law enforcement of-
ficers to use more sophisticated technologies free from constitutional re-
straints.1 66 Focusing on the privacy interest in heat emission rather than
the extent to which a technology can detect activities within a home weak-
ens Fourth Amendment protections for the individual.
167
In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment "pro-
tects people not places." 168 In accordance with this holding, the Court
rejected the notion that an actual physical invasion must occur in order
for police investigation to constitute a search. 169 The Tenth Circuit in
Cusumano noted that the Supreme Court in Katz did not "dwell upon these
183 (1984) (holding that police officers had not performed a Fourth Amendment
search when they entered defendant's open fields without search warrant and dis-
covered marijuana).
In Oliver, narcotics agents received a tip that Mr. Oliver was growing marijuana
on his farm. See id. at 173 (stating facts). Without a warrant, the agents entered
Oliver's land by driving past Oliver's home to a locked gate marked with a sign
reading "No Trespassing." See id. at 173 n.1. The agents walked around the gate
and searched Oliver's land, eventually finding a field of marijuana about one mile
from his home. See id. at 173.
The Court held that any privately-owned property outside of the home and
the yard is an "open field" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and is not
entitled to protection, including a heavily forested area. See id. at 180 n.11. The
Court stated that "the government's intrusion upon the open fields is not one of
those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. at 177. The Court construed the text of the Fourth Amendment strictly and
argued that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect people in their "persons,
houses, papers, and effects, [but] is not extended to the open fields." Id. at 176.
166. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1501 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995)
("The infrared targeting devices employed by the military are apparently now so-
phisticated enough to perform this feat [to resolve these heat signatures into some-
what indistinct images]. It seems only a matter of time before such capabilities
trickle down to law enforcement."), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.
1996).
167. See id. at 1500 (noting misplaced focus of majority-view approach on
whether thermal image scans constitute searches under Fourth Amendment). The
Cusumano court's approach underscores how the majority-view analysis endangers
Fourth Amendment protections. See id. (emphasizing that all activities in the
home warrant Fourth Amendment protections). A focus on an individual's privacy
interest in heat emitted will never result in finding that a thermal image scan is a
search. See id. at 1501 (reasoning that proper focus is not on privacy interest in
heat). As majority-view courts make clear, there is no expectation of privacy in
heat emitted from a home; however, this approach "ignore[s] both the purpose of
the device and the manner in which it operates." Id. If these courts examined
expectations of privacy in the activities that generate a significant amount of heat
detectable by a thermal imager, they would likely reconsider the holding that a
thermal image scan is not a search. See id. (opining that applying Fourth Amend-
ment principles to heat generating activities inside home could alter majority-view
courts' holdings).
168. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (discussing contours of Fourth Amendment
protections).
169. See id. at 352 (rejecting notion that physical trespass is required to main-
tain violation of Fourth Amendment).
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physical minutiae, but, rather, recognized that the Fourth Amendment
broadly protects from government intrusion that which a person reasona-
bly seeks to keep private."170 Thus, the holding in Katz did not turn on
the means by which the government obtained Mr. Katz's secrets, but
rather the measure of his expectation of privacy. 1 71 It is important to
note, in conjunction with the minority view, that the Court in Katz placed
no constitutional significance on the notion "that the inevitable physical
manifestations of protected activity extended into a public area."1 72
Thus, although the majority-view courts claim to follow Katz's hold-
ing, their misguided analysis runs roughshod over the very sources of pri-
vacy that these courts have recognized the Fourth Amendment
protects.1 73 The majority view incorrectly focuses on the passive nature of
thermal imaging technology.1 74 Although thermal imagers are passive be-
cause they measure only temperature differences in the surrounding envi-
ronment, they are important to law enforcement because they detect
many activities within a structure. 175 The technology creates black, white
and gray images that serve as proxies for actual activity within a structure,
and thus, can monitor the activities within a home.1 76
C. A Flexible Fourth Amendment Analysis to Deal with New Technologies
As technology improves and costs in technologies related to thermal
imagers drop, more local law enforcement agencies will have an opportu-
170. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1501 (discussing Court's decision in Katz).
171. See id. (noting that for Katz Court, attempt to breach privacy reasonably
afforded by walls of phone booth itself sufficed to implicate Fourth Amendment).
172. Id. at 1502.
173. See id. ("We trust that the government would, in most instances, employ a
[thermal imager] with discretion; nonetheless, the very existence of such discre-
tion would run afoul of the Constitution.").
174. See Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 901 (Pa. 1999) (not-
ing that relevant focus is not on whether device is passive, but rather what data
device records).
175. See id. at 902-03 ("The utility of the machine depends therefore not on
the inevitable and ubiquitous phenomenon of heat loss but on the presence of
distinguishable heat signatures inside the structure." (quoting Cusumano, 67 F.3d
at 1501)).
176. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1501 (discussing capabilities of thermal image
scan). The Tenth Circuit explained that a thermal imager
identifies only hot spots on a wall .. .[and] it is the existence of these
distinct interior sources that the device indirectly recognizes . . .and
records. While heat lost by a building is data of some limited value, the
true worth of the device-the very reason the government turned the
imager on the home of the Defendants-is predicated upon the transla-
tion of these thermal records into intelligible (albeit speculative) infor-
mation about the activities that generate the observed heat. The utility of
the machine depends therefore not on the inevitable and ubiquitous
phenomenon of heat loss but on the presence of distinguishable heat
signatures inside the structure.
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nity to buy and use sophisticated surveillance devices. 177 The armed
forces currently use highly sophisticated thermal imagers, and it is only a
matter of time before they are used by local law enforcement.
178
The vast majority of courts that have considered whether a thermal
image scan is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment have
concluded that it is not a search. 179 The analysis used by these courts,
however, threatens an individual's right to privacy.18 0 For example, in
United States v. Kyllo,181 the Ninth Circuit stated that the issue went to the
level of government intrusion on activities in the home, where individuals
expect privacy, rather than a measurement of heat emissions radiating
from the home.18 2 By focusing on heat emissions, rather than the moni-
toring of activities inside the home, majority-view courts leave open the
possibility that other more intrusive technologies may pass constitutional
muster.
183
177. See Anne Lamoy, Generosity of Donor Helps KCK Fire Department, KAN. CiTY
STAR, Jan. 15, 2000, at B2 (noting that FLIRs cost about $20,000). A price quoted
in January 2000, for example, is $5,000 less than the cost of a FLIR as little as six
months earlier. See Tim Hrenchir, Fund-RaiserAims to Save Helicopters, TOPEKA CAP.
J., Aug. 28, 1999 (stating price of thermal imager).
178. See FLIR Systems, FLIR Systems Awarded $1 70 Million in U.S. Navy, Marine
Corps Contracts at http://www.flir.com/news/newsitem.htm/id=af192363-AEI-
11D3-8A2A00104BCE5660/lang (last visited Feb. 9, 2000) (detailing NAVY con-
tract to provide thermal imager). FLIR Systems, Inc., designs and manufactures
thermal imaging equipment. See id. (stating manufacturer name). In August 1999,
FLIR announced that it had been awarded a multi-million dollar contract by the
U.S. Navy to supply sixty-one thermal imaging systems, referred to as MarFLIR, for
its maritime applications. See id. (outlining details of government contract). The
Navy contracted for up to eighty-five systems over five years. See id. (noting amount
of systems produced for government).
Many other industries have found thermal imaging useful. See McKnight,
supra note 2, at 1249-50 (discussing various industries relying on thermal imaging
technology). An example of a non-military use of thermal imaging is maintenance
of equipment to aid in the discovery of a major electrical fault or design defect in a
product. See FLIR Systems, Imaging Radiometry Provides Valuable Diagnostics at http:/
/www.flir.com/news/thermography/index.htm (visited Feb. 9, 2000) (detailing
non-military use of thermal imaging technology). Thermal imaging also provides
helpful long-range detection, effective support and added safety during intercep-
tion and arrest in connection with border control activities. See FLIR Systems, Bor-
der Patrol at http://www.flir.com/ground/applications/application.htm/id=
1A6D04A4-9D04-11D3-9DC80050040C5701/lang (visited Feb. 9, 2000) (explaining
utility of thermal imaging technology in patrolling borders).
179. For a discussion of cases holding that a thermal image scan is not a
search, see supra notes 40-97 and accompanying text.
180. SeeJohn Gibeauit, High Tech Heat Seeking: Warrantless Use of Detection De-
vice Splits Appeals Courts, 84 A.B.A.J. 34, 34 (1998) (stating that currently used anal-
ogies are inapplicable to new technologies).
181. 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 2000 WL 267066 (U.S. Sept.
26, 2000) (No. 99-8508).
182. See id. at 1046 (stating issue involved in case).
183. See Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 905 (Pa. 1999) (cit-
ing expectation of privacy in heat generating activities as basis for holding that
thermal image scan is search under Fourth Amendment).
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The answer to this conundrum requires a fresh perspective on Fourth
Amendment analysis concerning new thermal imaging technologies.'8 4
Although many academics raise important criticism concerning the rea-
soning used by some courts, the response need not be that all uses of
thermal imagers be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.1 85
A more reasonable approach to this issue would employ a sliding
scale analysis of thermal imaging technology. 186 The more sophisticated
the technology, the greater the Fourth Amendment protections should
be. 187 In short, a party objecting to a thermal image scan would need to
demonstrate that the scan revealed details of activity within the home. 18 8
This showing could be performed at a hearing where testimony concern-
184. See Gibeauit, supra note 180, at 34 (discussing thermal imaging). One
commentator has suggested a new Fourth Amendment jurisprudence which keeps
pace with innovative technologies. See id. (discussing alternative jurisprudence).
He stated:
More and more, police are using high-tech snooping to catch crooks, ter-
rorists, polluters and others. And as usual, technological innovations out-
pace growth in the law, so courts more often than not resort to outdated
analogies and off-the-mark reasoning to deal with newfangled problems.
Things can only get muddier.
Id.
185. See FLIR Systems, Inc., Latest News, at http://www.flir.com/index.htm/
sf=1/lang (visited Feb. 9, 2000) (noting usefulness of FLIR applications that do not
impact individual's privacy rights).
Thermal imagers provide helpful assistance in fields other than law enforce-
ment. See id. In fact, FLIR Systems promotes its technology as useful in primarily
outdoor applications. See id. In particular, FLIR Systems notes that FLIR technol-
ogy is effective in ground and aerial reconnaissance, firefighting and industrial
applications. See id.
186. See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 386 (stating current law is ill-equipped to
handle issues raised by new technology). In an effort to address this concern, the
American Bar Association established the Task Force on Technology and Law En-
forcement to review the Association's standards for electronic surveillance and
other advanced investigatory tools. See id. at 387 (discussing origin and task of
reviewing body).
187. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986)
(holding that use of camera in area "falling somewhere between 'open fields' and
curtilage" did not intrude upon Dow's reasonable expectations of privacy).
The Court in Florida v. Riley also noted that the intimacy of detail was relevant
for Fourth Amendment purposes but that no search occurred where a police of-
ficer in a helicopter circled twice over an enclosed greenhouse at a height of 400
feet and observed through openings in the roof what he thought was marijuana.
See Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (stating that police had not executed Fourth
Amendment search when viewing greenhouse from helicopter). The Court stated
that not every "inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will ... pass
muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within the navi-
gable airspace specified by law," but because no intimate details connected with
the use of the home or curtilage were observed, there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. Id. at 451.
188. See United States v. Depew, 210 F.3d 1061, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
requisite proof needed to show in order to establish Fourth Amendment
violation).
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ing the thermal imager's capabilities could be heard. 189 Thermal imagers
demonstrated to detect excess heat emanating from a specific place in a
home, rather than the details inside an individual's home, would require
reasonable suspicion, and in cases of thermal images which only detect
excess heat generally, no search warrant would be needed when intrusion
is minimal. 190 The American Bar Association, for example, notes that "the
availability and sophistication of the surveillance technology" and "the ex-
tent to which the surveillance technology enhances the law enforcement
officer's natural senses" are relevant factors in determining the extent of
necessary regulation of devices like thermal imagers.' 91
As thermal imagers improve in resolution, the reasonable expectation
of privacy analysis would focus on individuals' expectations of privacy in
their homes rather than in the expectation of privacy in the excess heat
emitted from their homes.192 Accordingly, the police would be required
189. See United States v. Elkins, 95 F. Supp. 2d 796, 796 (W.D. Tenn. 2000)
(stating that testimonial evidence presented at hearing indicated capabilities of
thermal imager).
190. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE:
TECHNOLOGIcALLY-AssISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE, Standard 2-9.6(a) (ii)-(iii) (3d
ed. 1999) ["ABA DRAFr STANDARDS"] (detailing proposed legal standards to deal
with new technologies).
The officer stopping a citizen must be able to articulate something more than
an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 27 (1968). The Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective
justification for making the stop. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)
(stating that level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by
preponderance of evidence).
In Terry, the Court recognized that the police must be free to pursue what it
termed a "legitimate investigative function." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. Under Terry's
two-prong analysis, courts must determine "whether the officer's action was justi-
fied at its inception, and whether the action taken was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 20.
To satisfy the first prong, "the police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion." United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1994) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). An examination of the totality of the circum-
stances satisfies the second prong. See United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 26 (1st
Cir. 1998) (discussing factors indicating reasonableness of stop and frisk).
191. See ABA DRAFr STANDARDS §§ 2-6.1 (c) (i) (D)-(E) (listing factors relevant
to regulating use of surveillance technology).
192. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that Fourth Amend-
ment focuses on whether individual has reasonable expectation of privacy in loca-
tion searched by police), affd, State v. Velasco, 728 A.2d 493 (1999). The Supreme
Court has held that probable cause means that there is "a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," and the level of suspicion re-
quired for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause. Id. at
238. Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause be-
cause it can be established with information that is different in quantity or content
than that which is required to establish probable cause. See id. (discussing reasona-
ble lsuspicion standard). Reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is
less reliable than that required to show probable cause. See Alabama v. White, 496
U.S 325, 329 (1990) (discussing situations where reasonable suspicion may legiti-
mately arise).
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to demonstrate reasonable suspicion or probable cause before using a
thermal imager that might infringe on an individual's privacy. 193
Presently, only cases involving basic thermal imaging technology have
been litigated. 194 A majority of courts have concluded that this form of
thermal imaging poses minimal threats to the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment. 95 As one commentator suggests, however, when technol-
ogy changes, the current mode of analysis may no longer be appropriate
for advanced technologies.1 96 Based on this observation, courts should
attempt to refine their analyses, rather than prevent law enforcement from
using an effective weapon in the war on drugs.1 97
V. CONCLUSION
Although current thermal imaging technology may be of "such low
resolution as to render it incapable of revealing the intimacy of detail and
activity protected by the Fourth Amendment," future technological devel-
opments may challenge that assertion.198 As one court noted, the nature
of technology is to improve and progress. 199 Although most courts agree
that current thermal imaging technology poses no constitutional threat,
the type of analysis chosen by the majority of courts will likely muddy
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with the advent of more sophisticated
technologies.200 Based on these issues, courts that have held that thermal
193. See McKnight, supra note 2, at 1265 (exploring Terry analysis as applied to
thermal imaging).
194. See Gibeauit, supra note 180, at 34 (stating that current cases deal with
thermal imagers that detect heat coming from structures and convert heat into
unclear visual images that distinguish warmer areas from cooler ones).
195. For a discussion of majority-view cases, see supra notes 41-97 and accom-
panying text.
196. See Gibeauit, supra note 180, at 34 (discussing current Fourth Amend-
ment analysis). Although not yet litigated, local law enforcement will surely be
able to acquire more sophisticated devices, "such as super-high-resolution satellite
photography and other tools that enable law enforcement to peer into areas be-
yond the reach of the human eye." Id. The Montana Supreme Court also dis-
cussed the limits of the current thermal imaging technology. See State v. Siegal,
934 P.2d 176, 181 (Mont. 1997) (examining developments in thermal imaging
technology), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont. 1998). The
Siegal court noted that "[at] present, thermal imagers do not 'see through walls' or
produce a distinct image of a person, object or activity within a structure, unless,
for example, a person has his body pressed against a window." Id., 934 P.2d at 181.
Therefore, current thermal imagers can reveal only that a structure is emitting
heat and determine the relative quantity of heat being produced. See id. (sug-
gesting that heat detecting abilities of thermal imagers are limited).
197. See FLIR Systems, Thermography, at http://www.flir.com/thermography/
products/thermacampm695/index.htm (visited Oct. 21,2000) (discussing poten-
tial and effectiveness of thermal imagers).
198. SeeUnited States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting capa-
bilities of military's thermal imagers).
199. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (dis-
cussing thermal imaging technology).
200. See id. at 1508 (discussing implication of majority-view rationale).
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image scans are not searches invite "reevaluation of these issues at some
indeterminate time in the future," and allow "the privacy of the home to
hinge upon the outcome of a technological race."20 1 Because of these
concerns, the United States Supreme Court will resolve this issue in the
2000-01 term. 20 2 The Court's opinion hopefully will put to rest this issue
and strengthen Fourth Amendment protections for citizens' privacy that is
threatened by thermal imaging.
Jeffrey P. Campisi
201. Id. at 1504 (explaining consequences of majority-view analysis).
202. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
2000 WL 267066 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-8508) (considering issue of whether
use of thermal imager by law enforcement officers constitutes Fourth Amendment
search).
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